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Abstract
Recent advances in learning Deep Neural Network
(DNN) architectures have received a great deal of at-
tention due to their ability to outperform state-of-the-art
classifiers across a wide range of applications, with little
or no feature engineering. In this paper, we broadly study
the applicability of deep learning to website fingerprint-
ing. We show that unsupervised DNNs can be used to
extract low-dimensional feature vectors that improve the
performance of state-of-the-art website fingerprinting at-
tacks. When used as classifiers, we show that they can
match or exceed performance of existing attacks across
a range of application scenarios, including fingerprinting
Tor website traces, fingerprinting search engine queries
over Tor, defeating fingerprinting defenses, and finger-
printing TLS-encrypted websites. Finally, we show that
DNNs can be used to predict the fingerprintability of a
website based on its contents, achieving 99% accuracy
on a data set of 4500 website downloads.
1 Introduction
Website Fingerprinting (WF) refers to a network-level
traffic analysis attack in which the timing, direction,
and volume characteristics of encrypted traffic between
a web client and a proxy are used to identify the websites
visited by the user, or to attempt to differentiate between
visits to monitored (sites that might be targeted for cen-
sorship) or unmonitored sites. First introduced by Hintz
in 2002 [16], recent work has focused primarily on the
application of WF attacks to perhaps the most widely-
used anonymity network, Tor. In this context, the at-
tacker monitors the traffic between a Tor client and the
guard relay, extracts features from this traffic, and then
attempts to classify this traffic based on these features.
Security researchers have adopted a variety of ma-
chine learning algorithms for WF attacks on Tor. Wang
et al. [38] utilized k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) with a
new weight learning technique, Panchenko et al. [28]
proposed a scalable attack with Support Vector Machine
(SVM), and Hayes and Danezis [13] adapted Random
Forest classification (k-FP) to be resilient to WF defenses
and noise. These classifiers have attained high true pos-
itive rates (TPR) and low false positive rates (FPR) at
the cost of a great deal of human effort in feature engi-
neering and clever algorithm adaptations. The primary
contribution of each of these works was to improve the
performance of classifiers by introducing new classifiers
or discovering new feature sets.
Recently, Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have
achieved impressive results in diverse research areas
such as image recognition [14,22,34], game playing [37],
and speech recognition [35]. Because DNNs can fit ar-
bitrary functions with little prior knowledge and can also
use multiple layers to learn different levels of abstraction
of input data [6], they have the potential to automate both
types of contribution to the literature on WF attacks.
There have been several efforts to apply DNN to traffic
analysis. Wang [41] adopted DNN for protocol detection
such as SSL. Schuster et al. [33] applied DNN to en-
crypted video stream analysis to identify which stream-
ing videos a user watched. Rimmer et al. [31] revis-
ited WF with deep learning algorithms using an immense
dataset. However, these works did not attempt to isolate
the benefits of automated feature engineering from clas-
sifier improvements, and primarily consider the closed
world or binary classification settings.
In this paper, we extensively explore DNN to propose
a variety of applications to traffic analysis, which were
not covered in previous work [31].
Contributions. We summarize key findings as follows:
Various Fingerprinting Attacks. We studied the suit-
ability of Multilayer Perceptrons (MLP) and Convolu-
tional Neural Networks (CNN)1 across a wider range
1The MLP architecture features several layers of neurons, each fully
connected to the layer before it; a CNN convolves its input with sev-
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of settings than Rimmer et al.: in addition to iden-
tifying top Alexa web sites in the closed and binary
open-world setting, we also study the performance of
these architectures in other WF tasks including multi-
class open-world classification, search query (keyword)
fingerprinting [26], Onion Service fingerprinting, TLS-
encrypted website fingerprinting, and WF against four
traffic padding schemes – BuFLO [11], Tamaraw [10],
WTF-PAD [18] and Walkie-Talkie [40]. We show that
for all of these tasks, DNNs can achieve equivalent or
better results to those published in the literature.
Overall, CNN is a better model across various sce-
narios and in particular, it is more effective against WF
defenses. CNN is capable of identifying 100 moni-
tored websites against 100,000 unmonitored websites
with 95% true positive rate and 0.04% false positive rate,
using only 9,000 traces of monitored training data. In
particular, BuFLO, WTF-PAD, and Walkie-Talkie with
previously recommended parameters become less effec-
tive against CNN since we successfully conduct the mul-
ticlass classification on 100 websites with 45%, 58%,
and 54% accuracy, respectively.
Feature Engineering. To isolate the benefits of DNNs
as feature extractors versus classifiers, we also investi-
gate the use of an autoencoder (AE), an unsupervised
learning technique to extract low-dimensional represen-
tations of a dataset, in combination with the classifiers
used in state-of-the-art WF attacks. We find that when
state-of-the-art WF attacks are applied to AE-extracted
features, they become more powerful than when using
hand-tailored feature sets in recent WF attacks. In partic-
ular, classifier accuracy is improved using AE-extracted
feature vectors with dimension as small as 20. This sug-
gests that AEs can be a powerful technique for feature
engineering in new traffic analysis attacks.
Predicting Fingerprintability Overdorf et al. con-
ducted website fingerprintability (FP) analysis using an
ensemble classifier based on three state-of-the-art WF
attacks using network-level and site-level features. In
this paper, we propose a novel fingerprintability predic-
tor based on MLP using feature sets that only focus on
elements in HTML documents such as statistics on links
and embedded web content.
While Overdorf et al. adopted the F1 score of an
ensemble classifier as a fingerprintability score, we use
accuracy of a MLP classifier trained on Tor traces of a
website (the proportion of correct predictions in the to-
tal number of testing instances of a website). We label
HTML-specific feature vectors with 1 or 0 to indicate
eral local shared “filter” units, which are locally “pooled” using a com-
mon function, before applying a single fully-connected layer; see Ap-
pendix B for further details
whether the accuracy of a website is greater than a “fin-
gerprintability threshold” (10-90%) or not.
We predicted the fingerprintability of 4,500 instances
of Alexa top 50 websites with 98-99% accuracy and less
than 0.02% mean squared error (MSE) under 10-40%
and 90% fingerprintability thresholds. Moreover, we find
that a MLP trained on Alexa top-67 websites can suc-
cessfully predict the fingerprintability of 85 low-ranked
Alexa websites with 98% accuracy and 1% MSE. In ad-
dition, even when we label HTML feature vectors based
on classification results by k-FP [13], FP classifiers show
comparable performance. Our FP predictor is effective
across various scales of background set, different test-
ing datasets, and different ML algorithms. These results
suggest that website designers interested in helping users
avoid WF attacks (or onion service designers interested
in protecting the location of their servers) can apply our
classifiers to the HTML source of their sites to predict
the vulnerability of content pages and alter them accord-
ingly.
2 State-of-the-art Attacks
The importance of feature engineering for WF with cut-
ting edge machine learning algorithms was first high-
lighted by Panchenko et al. [29]. Their hand-built fea-
tures based on traffic volume and timing were powerful
enough to have high TPR in an open world scenario.
Wang and Goldberg [39] proposed using Tor cell se-
quences as a new feature set and used SVM with dis-
tance based metrics to yield classifiers with 95% TPR
and 0.2% FPR. The k-NN classifiers with revised weight
learning, proposed by Wang et al. [38], enabled the at-
tacker to achieve higher TPR than prior WF attacks.
Panchenko et al. [28] demonstrated more scalable WF
with larger background datasets than previous research.
They proposed CUMUL classifiers using Support Vector
Machines (SVMs) with a new feature set based on cumu-
lative traces and obtained 96-97% TPR, higher than k-
NN classifiers [38]. Hayes and Danezis [13] conducted a
thorough analysis of new categorical features and built k-
FP classification models based on Random Forests with
Hamming distance. Their classifiers were less suscepti-
ble to padding-based WF defenses such as BuFLO [11]
and Tamaraw [10].
Oh et al. [26] extended WF with new feature sets to
investigate Keyword Fingerprinting (KF) attack, which
identify search engine queries over Tor that the user
typed. They built svmRESP classsifiers using SVM with
their RESP feature sets that focus on the response traffic
to capture embedded web objects in search engine re-
sults. They achieved 83% TPR and 8% FPR with svm-
RESP to correctly identify 100 monitored queries against
10k unmonitored queries.
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These works focused on finding features and machine
learning models, better suited to their datasets. Their
methodologies required substantial human effort to an-
alyze features and time-consuming trial-and-error proce-
dures to determine better classification algorithms.
Recently, Rimmer et al. [31] explored the applica-
tion of several DNN architectures, including Stacked De-
noising Autoencoder (SDAE), CNN, and Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM), to an enormous dataset to prove
DNN’s effectiveness and scalability for WF attacks.
In this paper, we delve into MLP, CNN, AE to ex-
plore a variety of applications including fingerprinting
attacks, automated feature extraction, and website finger-
printability prediction, for traffic analysis. In particular,
to show great power of automated feature engineering
using unsupervised learning in DNN, we revisited k-NN,
CUMUL, k-FP, and SDAE classifiers for comparison.
We give more detailed background on the MLP, CNN,
and AE architectures in Appendix B and describe imple-
mentation details relevant to our work in Section 4.4.
3 Feature Extraction
3.1 Dataset Overview
Website Tor traces (WTT). For monitored traces, we
used Wang’s dataset(Wang) [38], Tor Hidden Service
dataset(TorHS) [13] and we collected WTT-time dataset
consisting of 90 instances of each of Alexa top 100 web-
sites [1]. Wang’s dataset consists of 90 instances of each
of 100 monitored websites, and TorHS is comprised of
90 instances of each of 30 onion services. For WTT-time
dataset, we additionally downloaded HTML document
files for those traffic instances to be used in Section 5.
WTT-time dataset reflects the time gap, a week, between
4 different batches where each batch collects 110 traffic
instances of each of 100 websites. Therefore, one batch
started and the next batch executed after a week. Af-
ter filtering out instances having abnormal capture files
or HTML documents and sampling uniformly at random
from four batches comprising remaining instances, we
ended up with 90 instances for each of 100 websites. We
crawlered them from June to December in 2017.
For Section 6.6, we further harvested 90 instances
of 85 Alexa websites, ranked around one million. We
crawled those websites in September and December, and
we adopted the same batch settings as we used in WTT-
time dataset collection. For background traces, we used
the dataset, provided by Hayes and Danezis [13], which
contains one instance of each of one million websites.
Keyword Tor traces (KTT). For both monitored and
background traces, we used Google search query traffic
instances, provided by Oh et al. [26], which include 100
instances of each of 100 top-ranked monitored keywords
and 80,000 unmonitored instances.
Website SSL (non Tor) traces (WST). We harvested
TLS-encrypted website traces in normal web browser
settings and the dataset consists of 90 instances of each
of Alexa top 100 websites for a monitored set and 9,000
Alexa websites excluding monitored websites.
3.2 Features for DNN
Based on various traffic dataset, we introduce features
we used for MLP and CNN classifiers.
Tor traces for WF. Since Tor supports a specific trans-
mission unit, known as a Tor cell (512 bytes), we ex-
tracted a Tor cell sequence, which consists of 1 and -1
indicating that the client sends 512 bytes or receives 512
bytes, respectively. In addition, since all instances should
have the same feature dimension, we determined the op-
timal number of features using hyperparameter tuning,
shown in Section 4.3.
Tor traces for KF. We evaluated two feature sets, Tor cell
sequence and RESP trace, provided by Oh et al. [26].
RESP is the largest incoming burst and they extracted
the sequence of cumulated payload based on TLS record
length in RESP, however, we ignored the cumulative set-
ting because it gave us lower accuracy. By applying
hyperparameter tuning, we experimentally determined
2500 features as the optimal dimension and used it for
all KF experiments in Section 6.
TLS-encrypted traces. We evaluated various feature
sets including the inter-packet timing, the size of tcp
packet, and the length of tls record. With packet and
record size sequences, MLP did not show effective result.
However, when we used the sequence of packet direction
(-1 for incoming and 1 for outgoing), we reached better
TPR up to 82%. In contrast, we were able to achieve
92% TPR for CNN even with features based on the se-
quence of the size of TLS record. Experimental details
will be discussed in Section 6.3.
3.3 Features with Autoencoder
While an AE is widely used for reconstructing the data, it
is also known for the ability of feature dimensionality re-
duction because an encoder projects the original feature
vector into lower dimensional representation.
In this section, we explore features, learned by an AE,
to show their effect on the performance of SVM, k-NN,
and k-FP classifiers. In particular, this feature compres-
sion can make classifiers more efficient because their
training time highly depends on the dimension of the in-
put data, which often leads scalability issues. As shown
in Figure 8c of Appendix B, we trained an encoder and a
decoder and we captured feature vectors, compressed by
3
the second hidden blue layer of an encoder. These are en-
coded features. We also varied the number of units, 10-
100, in this hidden layer to compress the original features
into various low-dimensional representations. We evalu-
ated SVM, k-NN, and k-FP classifiers with encoded fea-
tures and reproduced state-of-the-art WF attacks to com-
pare their performance in Section 6.5. This shows pow-
erful capability of an AE on learning interesting structure
about the data while reducing its dimension.
With the autoencoder, we additionally tested a vari-
ational autoencoder (VAE) and extracted encoded fea-
tures as explained above, however, we failed to extract
meaningful traces. For VAE, we achieved 2% TPR for
multiclass classification and 3% TPR for the binary de-
cision. The reason for lower TPR with VAE was that we
failed to reduce the loss, specifically KL divergence loss
between latent space, which is the distribution of an en-
coder and its probability density function. Since this gap
was huge, KL divergence blew up and further led large
cost. Since the VAE injects random Gaussian noise and
optimizes the likelihood, the VAE performs more nicely
for datasets where the latent is important [24]. Website
traffic instances are less likely to have a reasonable es-
timated density that the log likelihood maximization re-
turns than the image dataset.
(a) Up to 784 features (b) Up to 100 features
Figure 1: Feature importance score using LRP.
3.4 Feature Importance using LRP
Layer-wise relevance propagation (LRP) [4] sheds light
on understanding how DNN recognizes the input dataset
and further, what features in the input contribute most to
DNN’s output. To use LRP, first, we decompose the out-
put of DNN into the sum of relevance scores in the input
vector. To do this, we start with the relevance of the out-
put node and iteratively backpropagate through the net-
work. This is similar to backpropagation and finally it
maps the relevance onto the input vector.
There are several decomposition methods to derive the
relevance score and we chose w2-rule [25]. This rule
selects the closest root in direction of maximal descent
when using Deep Taylor decomposition, which approxi-
mates the value of the neural network forward pass func-
tion. We map layer l’s activations xi, where i is node
at layer l, to node n’s (at layer l + 1) activation y j and
decompose the forward function in terms of w2-rule to
measure the relationship between xi and y. That is, the
relevance score sent from a layer l +1 to its predecessor
l, R(l,l+1)i← j =
w2i j
∑i′ w2i′ j
R(l)j , where wi j is the weight between
node i at layer l and j at layer l +1.
We used LRP toolbox [20] to choose more important
features in the input of Tor traffic instances and Tensor-
flow to build the network. We computed the relevance R
for each of 784 features in WTT-time dataset. After we
ran 10 experiments, we did summation of R for each fea-
ture index and visualize the sum score in Figure 1. The
first n Tor cells contribute more to the prediction output,
which empowers the decision on cutting off Tor cells at
the end to have the same length in data preprocessing.
When we derived three R scatter distributions for each of
0 (padding), 1(outgoing), and -1(incoming), which are
three values in the input vector, there is no noticeable
distinction between those values, which makes it hard to
determine which Tor cell direction impacts most to the
prediction output in terms of R (Figure 8 in Appendix C).
4 Traffic Analysis with DNN
In this section, we introduce our DNN architectures, met-
rics to evaluate the performance of our classifiers, and
hyperparameter tuning to find the optimal parameters to
train DNN models.
4.1 Threat Model
We assume a network-level, passive adversary who is
only able to monitor and capture network traces, sent and
received by users. Since the user uses a Tor browser, the
adversary is only able to observe network traffic between
the client and a Tor entry guard. In addition, there are no
cooperative adversaries involved in this communication
(e.g.,web servers, Tor relays, etc.).
Our attacker is interested in two types of classifica-
tion problems, one is to determine whether a monitored
trace is in his monitored list or not (binary classification),
and the other is to correctly predict which website the
user visited and which keyword the user typed (multi-
class classification).
4.2 Metrics
Traditional metrics. To evaluate the performance of
binary and multiclass classifiers in open-world setting,
we used the following metrics, adopted in previous
works [13, 26, 28].
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• True positive rate (TPR): This metric indicates the
proportion of positive samples that are predicted as
positive.
• False positive rate (FPR): This metric shows the
proportion of negative samples that are mispre-
dicted as positive.
• Bayesian detection rate (BDR): To reflect feasibil-
ity of our experiment setting, we used BDR, com-
puted by P(M|V ) = P(V |M)P(M)P(V |M)P(M)+P(V |B)P(B) , where
V means that the user is visiting one of monitored
websites, P(M) is the probability that the website is
included in monitored set and P(B) is the probabil-
ity that the website is included in unmonitored set,
that is P(¬M). P(V |M) is computed by TPR and
P(V |B) is estimated by FPR. We computed BDR in
a way, presented in k-FP attacks [13].
• Within-monitored accuracy (WMacc): In KF, we
used a Within-monitored accuracy, proposed by Oh
et al. [26] to measure the performance of multiclass
classifiers. This is computed by the number of TPs,
divided by the total number of monitored samples.
Confidence threshold. In DNN, the output layer returns
prediction probability vectors for all labels. Even though
the label with the highest probability is selected as a
predicted label, if its prediction probability is not high
enough, the confidence in the classifier’s decision be-
comes weakened. If the highest probability is less than
the confidence threshold, we regard this case as being
classified as “others”. Thus, we increased the confidence
thresholds, up to 90%, to show how much this factor
degrades the performance of DNN since it impacts the
number of FNs and TNs.
TopK analysis. Based on the prediction probability vec-
tor, we consider other meaningful labels if their proba-
bilities are high enough to be trustworthy although they
are not the highest. Those labels are contained in the top
k list. We varied k, 1-5, and if there is a match between
an actual label and the one in the top k list, it is a TP.
In the open world experiment, if the negative (unmon-
itored) label is included in the top k list and the actual
label is positive (monitored), we always treat it as a false
negative even if the top list includes a true label. We used
top k analysis in KF attacks(Section 6.2) and defended
traffic analysis (Section 6.4).
4.3 Hyperparameter Tuning
Since training DNN requires hyperparameters, searching
the optimal parameters is essential to ensure better pre-
diction result. To automate this procedure, we adopted
Tree of Parzen Estimators (TPE) [7], which is a form of
Bayesian optimization and used hyperopt library [8] to
implement this optimizer. First, we described the search
space, as shown in Table 1, and constructed DNN us-
ing tflearn library [3]. Then, DNN models are trained
and pass the prediction result to the optimizer, which
selects optimal parameter values for the next iteration
to minimize the prediction error. We summarize the
search space and chosen values for each DNN model,
used in our experiments, in Table 1. For feature dimen-
sion, we used 784 for website and Tor HS traces, 2,500
for keyword traces, and 10,000 for TLS-encrypted traces
in MLP evaluations. In addition, we adopted 1,200 for
TLS-encrypted traces and 2,500 for all other kinds of
traces to measure the performance of CNN.
4.4 DNN Architectures
We discuss general background on DNN models in Ap-
pendix B, and details of our architectures for DNN mod-
els in this section.
MLP. An MLP (Figure 8a in Appendix B) consists of
one input layer allowing a single vector, two hidden
fully connected layers, and one output layer with soft-
max function. We used L2 regularizations for the first
two hidden layers and the dropout between those layers
to minimize the impact of overfitting on the validation of
testing dataset. After hyperparameter tuning, we decided
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) as the best optimizer
to ensure faster backpropagation. To measure the error
rate of classifiers, we used the categorical cross entropy.
CNN. A CNN (Figure 8b in Appendix B) comprises an
input layer accepting 2 dimensional data, a convolutional
2D layer with 32 filters, followed by a 2D max pool-
ing layer, one hidden fully connected layer and an output
layer with softmax function. We applied L2 regulariza-
tion to the convolutional layer and the categorical cross
entropy to compute the loss in classification results.
In contrast to image dataset, 2D representations do
not carry meaningful information for network traffic in-
stances since they are sequences of -1 and 1. Hence,
we adopted 1 by n grid for the input data format, for
example, the vector of 2,500 features is represented in
1x2500, rather than 50x50, while still keeping 2D for-
mat. Moreover, we adjusted the format of filters, accord-
ingly. For instance, we used 1x3 instead of 3x3. This
transformation ensures better performance of CNN and
further, helps to avoid overfitting since it reduces the de-
gree of variation between results evaluating on different
portion of dataset.
AE. An AE (Figure 8c in Appendix B) consists of an en-
coder and a decoder network and each consists of two
fully connected layers. We changed the number of units
in the second hidden layer to get different feature dimen-
sions of compressed inputs to be fed into SVM, k-NN,
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and k-FP classifiers. To capture encoded features, we
saved a trained model and retrieved weights of the second
hidden layer and generated compressed vectors on target
input using those weights. We used the mean squared
error to calculate the loss of the classifier decisions.
5 Analysis on HTML documents
According to the fingerprintability analysis explored by
Overdorf et al. [27], the fingerprintability of website traf-
fic instances is affected by the size of websites. We aim
to study the same problem, however, using DNN and
HTML-specific feature set, and further discover web-
site design features to impact the fingerprintability. We
downloaded 9,000 HTML document files of Alexa top
100 websites and 7,650 files for Alexa 85 websites,
ranked around 1 million to extract HTML features.
5.1 HTML Features
Links and domains. First, we fetched all links and
crafted features based on the number of links and do-
mains in an HTML DOM. In particular, we inspected
how many links are from third party websites with the
expectation that downloading web objects from different
web servers makes the traffic pattern more various than
when all downloads occur from a single web server.
Tag path. We built all tag paths by iteratively adding a
tag if it was nested. For example, for a document con-
sisting of <html><body><a></a><b></b></body>
</html>, there are 4 tag paths, <html> (depth=1), <html>
<body> (depth=2), <html><body><a> (depth=3), and
<html><body><b> (depth=3). Based on tag paths, we
extracted statistical features about the number of tags
contained in a tag path, the frequency of increase or de-
crease in the size of tag paths, and the depth of tag paths.
These features measure the degree of the complexity or
simplicity of the website design.
Tags and other elements. We generated features about
the number of tags, attributes, and comments, and the
number of characters and words in data and style at-
tributes. These features impact the size of an HTML
DOM as well as the website.
Embedded files. Different types of files are embedded
in an HTML document file and traffic associated with
fetching those resources makes website more vulnerable
against WF attacks. We found that all image and video
contents are nested in an img tag. Based on this fact,
we computed the number and the proportion of image
and video files and furthermore, we located specific file
extensions to obtain counts and proportions of them (e.g.,
jpg, gif, ico, html, etc.). They impact the size of websites.
Other features. We computed the total transmission time
based on the start and end time in a traffic capture file
(e.g., pcap), and the size of a capture files and HTML
document files.
All features resulted in total 65 features, named HTML
features, and we generated the rank for each feature
by looking at each column in the matrix. For exam-
ple, if we have 3 instances, [[3,19,...,10], [7,10,...,201],
[17,7,...,25]], we converted features into the rank infor-
mation, [[1,3,...,1], [2,2,...,3], [3,1,...,2]] and fed them
into classifiers to determine whether a website is finger-
printable or not. We listed 65 features in Appendix D.
5.2 Fingerprintability Classifier.
Fingerprintability (FP) thresholds. After training and
testing MLP classifiers with 9,000 monitored website
traffic instances and 20k-100k background instances, we
computed the proportion of correct predictions for each
monitored website. We named it accuracy of each web-
site. Rather than restricting the accuracy threshold to a
certain cutoff, we applied 9 different thresholds, 10-90%,
to determine if it is fingerprintable. For example, if the
threshold is 10%, classifiers decide whether the accuracy
of the website is less than 10% or not. If yes, it is not
fingerprintable.
Metrics. HTML features of those website traffic in-
stances were labeled with 1 or 0, where it is 1 if its
accuracy was greater than a FP threshold, otherwise,
it is 0. This labeling led unbalanced number of in-
stances for each class, as shown in Table 2. To over-
come the imbalance in the dataset, we computed a to-
tal accuracy and a mean squared error (MSE) by ap-
plying class weights, derived based on the size of train-
ing samples for different FP thresholds (Table 2). That
is, MSE(y,y′)= 1N ∑
N
i=0 wi(y− y′)2 and Accuracy(y,y′)=
1
N ∑
N
i=0 wi1(y = y
′), where y and y′ are a true and a pre-
dicted value, wi is the weight of a sample i, and N is the
total number of samples.
We used 4,500 instances of 50 websites for training
dataset and 4,500 instances of other 50 websites for test-
ing dataset 2.
Gini importance. To measure the feature importance
score for each of 65 features, we used Gini impor-
tance [9], which is derived as the total number of splits
including target feature over the total number of samples
that the feature splits, by running Random forest classi-
fiers. In other words, this score means an average pu-
rity, earned by splits of target feature. We used Gini im-
portance to see which HTML DOM features contributed
most to the fingerprintability of websites in Section 6.6.
With FP thresholds and metrics, we adopted MLP
to evaluate its applicability to the fingerprintability pre-
2The fact that all features have the same dimension, 65 in all 9,000
instances can relieve the concern on overfitting even though we only
used 4,500 instances for training.
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Table 1: DNN Hyperparameter tuning using HyperOpt.
DNN MLP AE CNN
HyperParam Choice Space Choice Space Choice Space
input dim 784,2500,10k 0∼ 10k 784 0∼ 5000 1200,2500 700∼ 5000
optimizer SGD SGD,Adam Adam SGD,Adam SGD SGD,Adam,RMSProp
learning rate 0.08∼ 0.09 0.001∼0.1 0.001 0.001∼0.1 0.1 0.001∼0.1
epoch ≤50 10∼1000 10 10∼1000 50∼100 10∼1000
batch ≤40 10∼100 256 10∼300 ≤30 28∼128
number of layers 4 3∼5 4 3∼5 5 3∼7
hidden units 600∼ 700 10∼1000 200∼ 300 10∼1000 200∼ 300 10∼1000
dropout 0.8 0.2∼0.9 - - 0.8 0.2∼0.9
activation tanh tanh, relu, sigmoid tanh tanh, relu tanh tanh, leaky-relu, elu
number of filters - - - - 32 4∼128
filter size - - - - 3 2∼16
kernel size - - - - 2 2∼50
diction. All experimental results are discussed in Sec-
tion 6.6.
Table 2: Number of instances of less than and greater
than a FP threshold in 9,000 web trace instances.
.
FP thr # less # greater
10 68 8932
20 316 8684
30 680 8320
40 972 8028
50 2161 6839
60 3399 5601
70 5222 3778
80 6787 2213
90 8036 964
6 Experiment
In this section, we present the results of our experiments
applying DNN models to website fingerprinting in the
range of scenarios described previously. In each sce-
nario, the attacker either tries to decide whether the user
was browsing a monitored website or not (binary clas-
sification) or which website the user visited (multiclass
classification),
We explored using DNNs for WF attacks on Tor (Sec-
tion 6.1), KF attacks on Tor (Section 6.2), WF attacks on
TLS-encrypted traffic (Section 6.3), WF attacks on Tor
with padding defenses Section 6.4), feature engineering
for state-of-the-art attacks (Section 6.5), and fingerprint-
ability prediction (Section 6.6), and report the best ex-
perimental setting for each scenario.
Experiment setup. We used Tensorflow [2] with
TFLearn [3] front end for the implementation of DNN
classifiers. We split the WTT, KTT, and WST datasets
into training and testing datasets by the ratio, 60:40. We
constructed 20 different iterations, where each iteration
consists of randomly chosen monitored and background
instances. We randomly selected the same number of in-
stance indices for each monitored website to ensure that
the number of classes in each iteration was equal. We
adopted 20 iterations for all experiments in this section.
We used 8 cores and 32GB of memory for the exper-
iments using MLP and AE models and other machine
learning algorithms, and 32 cores and 258GB of memory
for CNN classifiers. With those resources, the longest
job was finished within 2 days. With GPUs, this running
time would be considerably reduced.
6.1 Website Traffic Analysis.
We evaluated both MLP and CNN classifiers using WTT-
time and Tor HS datasets in the open world setting by
varying different factors.
Background set. To show the effect of background set,
we trained MLP and CNN classifiers with the WTT
dataset, where we have 9,000 traffic instances of 100
monitored websites (each instance labelled according to
its site) and 1 traffic instance of 20,000, 50,000, and
100,000 background websites (all labelled with a single
“background” label).
Increasing the number of unmonitored traffic instances
weakened the performance of both classifiers but not sig-
nificantly, since we achieved 90% TPR and 1% FPR
for MLP multiclass classifiers even against 100k back-
ground dataset, given BDRs ranging from 87-89% (Ta-
ble 4). We conclude that DNNs are very successful at
open-world WF attacks, as shown in Tables 3 and 4.
Confidence threshold. To investigate the reliability of
decisions made by DNN classifiers, we additionally ap-
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Table 3: WF with MLP by varying the size of background
sets (TPR(T), FPR(F), and BDR(B) (%), and H=Tor HS)
.
Size Multiclass BinaryT F B T F B
20k 94±1 5±1 89±1 95±1 0.3 99.2
50k 92±1 2 88±1 93±1 0.1 99.2
100k 90±1 1 87±1 91±1 0.07 99.1
30k(H) 94±2 3 70±1 96±1 0.06 97.1
Table 4: WF with CNN by varying the size of background
sets (TPR(T), FPR(F), and BDR(B) (%), and H=Tor HS)
.
Size Multiclass BinaryT F B T F B
20k 97±1 6±1 88±1 98±1 0.3 99.3
50k 95±1 3±1 85±2 96±1 0.1 99.1
100k 94±2 2±1 84±2 94±2 0.04 99.5
20k(H) 98.49 3.69 78±1 98.91 0.18 98.6
plied 0-90% confidence thresholds (0 corresponds to
argmax) to prediction probabilities to decide if a clas-
sifier gives confident TPs. After we evaluated MLP and
CNN classifiers using 9,000 monitored traces and 20k
background traces, increasing the confidence threshold
reduced the number of confident TPs, which lowered
TPR, increased the number of TNs, which decreased
FPR, and elevated BDR (Figure 8 and 3).
(a) True Positive Rate (b) False Positive Rate
Figure 2: WF evaluation using MLP in the multiclass
setting by varying confidence threshold and unmonitored
set.
(a) True Positive Rate (b) False Positive Rate
Figure 3: WF evaluation using CNN in the multiclass
setting by varying confidence threshold and unmonitored
set.
Network. As shown in Table 3 and 4, CNN classifiers
showed better results except FPR in multiclass classifica-
tion, although the gap between FPRs of both classifiers
was not high. More interestingly, as shown in Figure 3,
the increase in the confidence threshold hardly impacted
the performance of classifiers across all metrics.
Summary. Feeding more background instances some-
what decreases the performance of DNN classifiers,
however, CNN models demonstrate very high multino-
mial classification accuracy with 92% TPR and 1% FPR
against 100k background traces. Even with the Tor HS
dataset, DNN classifiers performed effectively with 94-
98% TPR and 3-4% FPR in multiclass setting.
In particular, in the binary classification, both classi-
fiers presented almost 0% FPR, indicating that WF at-
tacks based on DNN models become more feasible since
they reduce the chances of misclassification.
6.2 Keyword Traffic Analysis
Table 5: KF with MLP(M), and CNN(C) using
both RESP and cell traces. ((b):binary classification,
(m):multiclass classification)
Metrics RESP(C) RESP(M) Cell(M)
TPR(b) 86±1 88±1 59±2
FPR(b) 5 5±1 11±2
BDR(b) 95 95±1 85±2
WMacc(m) 22±1 27±1 22±1
BDR(m) 59±2 63±1 50±1
We used 100 instances of each of 100 monitored key-
words and 10,000 background keyword traffic instances
in the KTT dataset and two feature sets, RESP traces and
Tor cell traces.
Features. Since Oh et al. [26] proposed that RESP-based
features make KF attacks stronger, we explored whether
this is true with MLP classifiers. Compared to Tor cell
traces, Table 5 shows that RESP features substantially
enhanced the performance of MLP classifiers. In ad-
dition, with RESP features, we achieved better perfor-
mance (88% TPR and 5% FPR) than svmResp in the
binary classification since svmResp yielded 82.6% TPR
and 8.1% FPR.
Top K analysis. We evaluated DNN classifiers using
WMacc, as used in Oh et al. [26]’s work. Compared
to binary classification, multinomial classification results
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using DNN classifiers were not as powerful, as shown in
(Table 5). To further investigate the performance of mul-
ticlass classifiers, we adopted the top k analysis by con-
sidering additional predicted labels that yield reasonably
high prediction probabilities.
As shown in Figure 4, top k analysis helps to substan-
tially improve the quality of multiclass classification for
both Tor cell and RESP features. When using the top
5 analysis, MLP classifiers derived higher WMacc than
svmRESP (62% vs. 55%).
Confidence threshold and network. As shown in Sec-
tion 6.1, increasing the confidence threshold deteriorates
the performance of DNN classifiers. Although overall
CNN classifiers are more robust against this factor, as
shown in Figure 5b, they also exhibit larger standard de-
viation with high confidence thresholds than MLP classi-
fiers. There is much less distinction power between key-
word traces, and in particular fewer local patterns to be
learned by filters, making CNNs a less ideal choice for
this task. However, with more training data the predic-
tion results become more stable across different portions
of the dataset.
Summary. KF using DNN classifiers outperformed svm-
Resp [26], and using the top-k approach improves the
multinomial classification capability of MLP classifiers
for KF attacks.
6.3 TLS-encrypted Traffic Analysis
Metrics packet time TCP packet TLS record
TPR (%) 83.03 81.74 82
FPR (%) 9.55 10.64 12.53
Table 6: MLP performance over TLS-encrypted traffic
data.
In this section we evaluate DNN classifiers using TLS-
encrypted traces by varying feature set and dimensions.
We used the WST dataset, consisting of 9000 monitored
instances from Alexa top 100 websites and 9000 back-
ground website instances.
Features. We built three types of sequences, based on
inter-packet timing, the size of TCP packets, and the
length of TLS records. In the first trial, TCP packet and
TLS record sequences performed poorly (For TCP, 48%
TPR and 11% FPR, for TLS, 50% TPR and 14% FPR).
Using MLP models, we achieved the best performance,
83% TPR and 10% FPR, using the sequence of packet
directions, giving the results shown in Table 6.
Network. We further evaluated CNN classifiers using
the representation based on the sequence of TLS record
sizes, and achieved 92% TPR and 4% FPR. CNN clas-
sifiers improved on the result obtained by MLP classi-
fiers (92% vs. 82%). Filters in CNN produce stronger
representations of the step by step interactions in web-
site downloads based on the local input patterns in TLS-
encrypted traffic.
Summary. MLP classifiers performed better with the
feature sequence consisting of binary information, -1 and
1. This transformation is consistent with the intuition
behind batch normalization [17], which leads to higher
learning rates without sacrificing the accuracy by solving
internal covariate shifts. With the input vectors consist-
ing of -1 and 1, MLP classifiers are less prone to high
gradients, which could result from large TLS records.
6.4 Defended Traffic Analysis
In this section, we evaluated DNN classifiers against re-
cent WF defenses, BuFLO [11], Tamaraw [10], WTF-
PAD [18], and Walkie-Talkie [40]. BuFLO [11] pads
dummy packets to fill in timing gaps and further extends
the transmission to send packets of fixed length at fixed
intervals. Tamaraw [10] improves BuFLO to be a more
efficient and effective defense by using different padding
intervals for incoming and outgoing packet direction and
fixing outgoing packets at a higher packet interval, which
reduces the overhead for infrequent outgoing traffic. To
propose lighter-weight WF defenses, Juarez et al. [18]
focused on hiding large gaps between bursts, which make
traffic instances distinct, and randomly selected gaps and
filled them in to hide this traffic pattern. WTF-PAD
significantly decreases bandwidth overhead as well as
latency while yielding good performance against k-NN
classifiers. Walkie-Talkie [40] is an efficient WF defense
technique based on half-duplex communication and burst
molding, which make many packet sequences the same
and add fake cells to burst sequences to be molded into
the supersequence.
BuFLO and Tamaraw. Due to the bandwidth overhead,
feature vectors for these data sets had higher dimen-
sion: for MLP classifiers, we used 20,164 (BuFLO) and
15,129 (Tamaraw) features and for CNN classifiers, we
generated 30,000 (BuFLO) and 25,000 (Tamaraw) fea-
tures. For Table 7, we evaluated DNN classifiers using
Wang and Tor HS dataset in the closed-world setting, fol-
lowing Hayes and Danezis [13]. Based on Table 7 and
Table 1 reported by Hayes and Danezis [13], MLP clas-
sifiers performed effectively the same as k-FP classifiers
did against BuFLO and much better than other WF at-
tacks under Tamaraw. CNN classifiers outperformed all
other classifiers against both defenses, yielding 46-53%
accuracy against BuFLO and 17-35% against Tamaraw.
Walkie-Talkie. We used the dataset provided by Wang
and Goldberg [40], to train and test DNN classifiers. As
shown in Table 1 [40] and Table 8, even though Walkie-
Talkie reduced the accuracy of MLP classifiers, MLP
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(a) Resp trace (b) Cell trace
Figure 4: ROC of Top-K analysis on KF for multiclass clas-
sification
(a) MLP (b) CNN
Figure 5: KF(RESP) with MLP and CNN by varying the
confidence threshold
Table 7: MLP and CNN performance under BuFLO(B) and Tamaraw(T) (Non:No defense).
DNN MLP CNN
Dataset Wang TorHS Wang
Defense Non B T Non B T Non B T
Bandwidth overhead(%) 0 217 181 0 1,240 1,019 0 217 181
Top1(%) 86±2 19±1 15±2 60±2 34±1 14±1 92±1 45±4 17±1
Top3(%) 91±2 35±2 26±2 67±2 48±2 23±1 96 53±2 33±2
Top5(%) 91±2 38±3 27±3 68±2 50±2 23±1 96 53±2 35±2
Table 8: The performance of DNN classifiers under
Walkie-Talkie. For Top k analysis, we chose the confi-
dence threshold leading optimal accuracy. Note that Un-
def means traces, collected without the defense and Def
indicates traces, collected under the defense (Bandwidth
overhead=113%).
MLP CNN
Topk Undef Def Undef Def
Top1 84±5 26±3 89±3 54±1
Top3 88±3 37±4 93±3 64±1
Top5 89±3 38±3 93±3 65±1
classifiers still worked adequately and the top-k approach
somewhat improved the performance of MLP classifiers.
More surprisingly, CNN classifiers yielded much better
quality of multinomial classification with accuracy of 54-
65%.
WTF-PAD. We explored CNN classifiers using two
datasets, one provided by Juarez et al. [18] (named
Juarez dataset) and the other shared by Li et al. [23],
which we call the WTF dataset. Juarez dataset comprises
34 instances of each of 100 websites and WTF dataset
includes 100-600 instances of the Alexa top 100 web-
sites. As shown in Table 9, even with 34 instances, CNN
classifiers presented reasonable closed-world accuracy,
53-58%. Based on WTF dataset, they performed much
better with more training dataset using 550 instances.
Summary. MLP classifiers performed adequately
Table 9: The performance of CNN classifiers under
WTF-PAD. For Top k analysis, we chose the confi-
dence threshold yielding optimal accuracy (For Juarez,
bandwidth overhead=166%, for WTF, bandwidth over-
head=174%).
Juarez(34) WTF(100) WTF(550)
Topk Undef Def Def Def
Top1 88±1 53±1 53±1 58±1
Top3 93±1 57±1 58±1 65±1
Top5 94±1 58±1 58±1 65±1
against WF defenses, however, CNN classifiers showed
superior accuracy against all 4 defenses. The superior
capability of CNNs against Walkie-Talkie and WTF-Pad
show that defenses focused on burst padding are not
enough to hide local patterns against filters in CNNs even
though they ensure more efficient bandwidth overhead.
6.5 Recent WF Attacks with AE Features
We revisited cutting edge WF attacks [13, 28, 38] and
used the machine learning algorithms chosen in those
works, with new features, learned by an AE (AE fea-
tures). Feature engineering, suggested by recent WF re-
search [13, 28], usually requires a considerable amount
of human efforts such as manually inspecting the traffic
pattern and experimentally deciding the optimal dimen-
sion of feature vectors. Feature extraction based on AEs
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Table 10: Performance of state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms with AE
features (dim: feature dimension).
Binary Multiclass
dim 10 80 20 80
TPR FPR TPR FPR TPR FPR TPR FPR
k-NN 96±1 3±1 98±1 2±1 82±2 2±1 84±2 2±1
SVM 95 3 98 1 97 12 97 10
k-FP 94±1 2±1 96±1 1±1 81±2 1±1 83±1 1±1
Table 11: The best performance us-
ing Wang’s dataset (AE(n): n fea-
tures).
Metrics TPR FPR
CUMUL 96.59 9.55
k-NN 90.17 10.26
k-FP 88 0.5
SDAE 92.42 12.54
AE(80)+k-NN 97.89 2.07
AE(100)+SVM 97.6 1.47
AE(80)+k-FP 96.2 0.98
MLP 96.56 2.78
CNN 96.72 1.78
offers the potential to automate this process. We used 90
instances of each of 100 monitored websites and 9,000
background websites in Wang’s dataset.
To feed AE features into WF classifiers, we adopted
the implementation of CUMUL [28] and k-FP [13] af-
ter removing feature extraction part. However, since
the implementation of k-NN [38] is suited to features
based on a Tor cell trace, we implemented k-NN using
sklearn.neighbors with weight learning that com-
putes the inverse of the distance between neighbors to
handle AE features in a better manner.
To understand how the dimension of AE features im-
pacts the performance of classifiers, we varied the num-
ber of units, 10-100, in the hidden layer, which encoded
website traffic vectors. This layer corresponds to the blue
layer in Figure 8c in Appendix B. In implementation per-
spective, this procedure is very simple since we can save
a trained AE model at the end of training and extract
compressed features on target data using weights of an
encoder network, kept in a trained model.
Since the dimension of this hidden representation is
significantly lower than the length of the original in-
put vector, this leads to dimensionality reduction. Af-
ter we performed the open-world evaluation based on
Wang’s dataset, we realized that the dimension of hid-
den units of an AE scarcely impacted the performance
of machine learning algorithms in binary classification.
Similarly, in multiclass classification, there was almost
no change on both metrics for feature vectors with di-
mension larger than 20 (Figure 10 in Appendix E). As
shown in Table 10, AE features enabled classifiers to
yield comparable performance to state-of-the-art WF at-
tacks [13, 28, 38], even with much lower feature dimen-
sionality and no human effort. We achieved much lower
FPR than k-NN [38] and higher TPR than k-FP [13]
while spending much shorter time in feature engineer-
ing. By the comparison to CUMUL [28], we obtained
similar results in much shorter training time since classi-
fier learning with AE features of dimension 20 took 39
minutes while the same process with CUMUL features
took 4 hours. Note that training time does not include
the time spent on feature extraction.
In Table 11, we reproduced state-of-the-art WF at-
tacks [13, 28, 38] and Stacked Denoising Auto Encoder
(SDAE) [31] using Wang’s dataset in open-world setting.
For SDAE, we discovered the optimal parameters for
our experiment setting by running hyperparameter tuning
over the search space, reported in the paper [31] and used
them for training SDAE. AE features improved the per-
formance of all three attacks and MLP and CNN classi-
fiers presented comparable performance without the sep-
arate feature extraction procedure.
Summary. Based on these experiments, DNN’s ability
to automate feature extraction significantly reduces effort
required for feature engineering with other classification
algorithms as well as generating cost-effective features.
In addition, the dimensionality reduction is another ad-
vantage to ensure faster running time of algorithms be-
cause AE keeps as much information as it can in a com-
pressed representation and these lower-dimensional fea-
tures reduce the training time of classifiers. Furthermore,
since the cost function plays an important role in train-
ing, it impacts the encoded data, which indicates that by
adjusting the cost function with in-depth understanding
on the input data, we can elaborate this feature engineer-
ing procedure to generate more powerful features.
6.6 Fingerprintability Prediction
Webpages exhibit a range of “fingerprintability,” in that
some pages are easy to identify by their traces while
others are not. To study what factors contribute to this
property, we used the following methodology. First, we
compute the accuracy of each website by training and
testing an MLP classifier using 90 instances each of the
Alexa top 50 web sites, and single instance of 9000 back-
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(a) With different confidence thresholds (b) With different sizes of background sets (c) With testing unpopular websites
Figure 6: Accuracy and MSE when varying the FP threshold and the size of background dataset
(a) Testing with top 50 alexa websites(b) Testing with unpopular 85 alexa
websites
Figure 7: The feature importance of each of 65 features
according to FP thresholds.
ground websites. Note that we used 10 iterations, where
each iteration randomly selects training and testing data
with the ratio 60:40. Then, based on prediction results,
we computed the fraction of instances labelled as True
positives for the accuracy. These websites were used
as “training” data for the fingerprintability (FP) classi-
fier. We followed the same procedures with Alexa top
61-100 monitored websites to determine the accuracy of
the “testing” websites.
Based on HTML document files for each training
and testing websites, we constructed 65 HTML features,
shown in Appendix D, computed ranks for each feature,
and labeled HTML feature vectors with 1 or 0, depend-
ing on whether the corresponding website accuracy was
greater than a certain FP threshold (In other words, the
website is fingerprintable) or not, respectively. Finally,
we trained MLP classifiers as FP classifiers with those
features and labels.
FP threshold. To define the fingerprintability of each
website traffic instance, we varied accuracy thresholds,
10-90%, to show how increasing the threshold impacts
the performance of classifiers.
As shown in Figure 6a, if we increased the FP thresh-
old, the accuracy of classifiers continually decreased and
the mean squared error (MSE) increased until the thresh-
old reached 70%. After that, the accuracy was increas-
ing with decreasing MSE. According to Figure 6, we
achieved accuracy of 98-99% for 10-40% thresholds and
95% for 90% threshold. This shows that the FP classi-
fiers performed better with relatively smaller or higher
thresholds. Section 5.2 described how we applied class
weights to derive both the accuracy and the error rate.
Feature importance. We adopted Gini importance, ex-
plained in Section 5.2, to derive the feature importance
score and Figure 7 shows those scores for different con-
fidence thresholds. Then, we computed the sum of those
scores for each of 65 features to select the top 15 features,
shown in Table 13 of Appendix F.
The total number of unique domains (feature index 5)
and third party links (feature index 3) are more important
HTML features for Alexa top 61-100 websites and this is
consistent with our expectation that the traffic regarding
the communication with third party websites ruins traf-
fic pattern to be indistinguishable (Table 12). The num-
ber of characters and words and embedded web objects
such as images (feature index 30,40,50-55), included in
HTML document files, are also important features. Ta-
ble 12 indicates that web pages carrying less amount of
static web contents (e.g., texts, images,etc.) are easy to
fingerprint while webpages including dynamic web ob-
jects (e.g., html) 3 are hard to fingerprint.
All these top features highly affect the fingerprintabil-
ity across different FP thresholds as shown in Figure 7a.
Background set. To show the effect of the amount of
background data on the performance of FP classifiers,
we used 20,000, 40,000, and 80,000 background website
instances. According to Figure 6b, feeding more unmon-
itored traffic instances had little effect on the accuracy
and furthermore, the performance of FP classifiers was
almost the same against 10-40% FP thresholds. Overall,
3We found that most dynamic web contents such as news and feeds
are embedded in a webpage with a file extension, html.
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Table 12: Important features for fingerprintable (accuracy ≥ 90%), and less fingerprintable (accuracy ≤ 10%) web-
sites.
Feature Index 3 5 30 40 51 55
90% 16±10 9±6 28k±25k 16k±15k 196±125 23±19
10% 109±37 49±16 14k±5k 3k±218 12±10 459±157
the worst accuracy in FP predictions resulted from using
a FP threshold of 70%, thus we suggest closer numbers
(e.g.,10,20,90%,etc.) to either end in the accuracy range
for the FP threshold to produce the best results.
Unpopular websites. To investigate the impact of differ-
ent testing dataset on FP classifiers, we furthermore col-
lected 90 traffic instances of each of 85 unpopular Alexa
websites, ranked around 1 million, and downloaded their
HTML document files. We trained MLP using HTML
features of Alexa top 67 websites (90 instances for each)
and tested it with HTML features of 5,100 unpopular
website traffic instances. In this experiment, we show
how FP classifiers perform toward unpopular websites.
For good FP thresholds (10-40% and 90%) identified
in previous experiments, we achieved slightly higher er-
ror rates while the accuracy was almost the same (Fig-
ure 6c). For worse FP thresholds (60-70%), MSE be-
came much greater and the accuracy also decreased.
That is, across different sizes of background datasets, the
fingerprintability prediction on unpopular websites has
more uncertainty with increased error rates and this be-
comes more severe with bad FP thresholds. However,
10-30% and 90% FP thresholds still yielded trustworthy
results with 98-99% accuracy and MSE of 0.1-2%.
We listed the top 15 features based on feature impor-
tance scores for HTML features of 85 unpopular web-
sites in Table 14 of Appendix F. As shown in Figure 7b,
even though different features appeared in the top list,
statistics about domains (feature index 4-5) and embed-
ded web contents (feature index 43) still impact the fin-
gerprintability of unpopular websites, which is also con-
sistent with previous results using Alexa top websites.
Moreover, we investigated feature 4-5 and feature 43
to observe distinction between popular and unpopular
websites. The degree of variation in all three features
becomes higher in popular websites and more unique do-
mains (7 vs. 4) and embedded web objects are included
in popular websites (67 vs. 45). This leads increased
MSE while weakening the performance of FP classifiers
when we evaluated against unpopular websites.
Labeling with results of k-FP. In this experiment, we
show that our FP classifiers can be applicable to pre-
dict fingerprintability against other state-of-the-art WF
attacks. To generate training labels, we ran k-FP [13]
classifiers with our dataset consisting of Alexa top 67
monitored websites and 20,000 background dataset. To
obtain testing labels, we applied the same experiment
setting with 82 unpopular Alexa websites. Then, we ex-
tracted 65 HTML features based on elements of their
HTML documents and based on results, returned by k-
FP classifiers, we computed the accuracy for each mon-
itored website and labelled features with 1 or 0 in a way
we described earlier. Finally, we trained MLP classifiers
with 67 popular website and tested it with 82 unpopu-
lar websites. With 30% FP threshold, we achieved 98%
of accuracy and 2% MSE. This indicates that our fin-
gerprintability classifiers can be further deployed for WF
defenses against recent WF attacks. We will leave further
investigation on other WF attacks for future works.
Summary. Based on FP classifiers, we can guide devel-
opers with safer design of websites against traffic anal-
ysis. Furthermore, we can develop a fuzzing-like tool
to 1) automatically scrutinize documents to identify vul-
nerable patterns in HTML DOM, which makes website
traffic more distinct, 2) propose more resilient HTML
DOM, and 3) test the new DOM to check if it actually
minimizes the predicted fingerprintability. This can pre-
vent the website from leaking the web visiting activity of
the user or endangering the onion service location.
7 Conclusion
We extensively explored DNNs for traffic analysis and
proposed 3 different applications, automated feature en-
gineering, fingerprinting attacks, and fingerprintability
prediction. As a feature extractor, lower dimensional
representations, learned by an AE, made state-of-the-art
WF attacks more effective as well as efficient. For fin-
gerprinting attacks, DNN performed nicely across vari-
ous traffic datasets and different fingerprinting tasks, and
against recent WF defenses. Lastly, MLP classifiers suc-
cessfully decided the fingerprintability of websites using
HTML features, leaving the future work on WF defenses
using FP classifiers to ensure safer onion service.
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A Appendix
B Deep Neural Network
In this section, we briefly discuss Multilayer Perceptron
(MLP), Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), which
are methods for supervised learning, and Autoencoder
(AE), which is an unsupervised learning method.
Multilayer Perceptron. MLP [12, 32], shown in Fig-
ure 8a, is a basic neural network, a sort of feed forward
network, and also is known as a backpropagation algo-
rithm. It consists of an input layer, one or more fully-
connected hidden layers and an output layer. Therefore,
MLP always has at least 3 layers. In fully-connected lay-
ers, all nodes have full connections to all activations in
previous layer. Activation functions are computed by a
matrix multiplication, which is followed by a bias offset.
MLP two procedures, forward propagation, which
initializes weights and forwards pass through multiple
layers to produce the output, back propagation, which
calculates errors of the output layer, and then updates
weights layer by layer. A single pass through is called
an epoch and consists of multiple batches.
We applied the softmax function in the output layer,
which is the generalization of the binary Logistic Re-
gression to multiclass setting. It takes the vector of ar-
bitrary real values and a vector of values in [0,1], where
the sum is 1. This real-valued score is normalized class
probability. Since we used a cross entropy to com-
pute the loss, we analyze it as unnormalized log prob-
ability for each class and apply a cross entropy loss,
E=−∑nClassi tilog(yi), where i is a class index, nClass is
the total number of classes, ti is a target probability, and
yi is an output probability. The total loss for the dataset
is computed by the mean of E over all training samples.
Convolutional Neural Network. CNN [21], shown in
Figure 8b, consists of one or more convolutional layers,
followed by one or more fully connected layers. The for-
ward propagation runs three series of operations, convo-
lution, pooling, and classification. The convolution op-
eration extracts features from the input by learning fea-
tures using small squares of input, which are called filters
or kernels. That is, we slide filters across the width and
height of the input and calculate dot products between
entries of the filter and the input to generate a 2D feature
map. Sliding different filters over the same feature gener-
ate different feature maps and CNN can learn meaningful
pattern through this procedure.
Pooling reduces the dimension of the feature maps and
thus, the amount of parameters and computation in the
network. Max pooling layer operates on selecting the
max element from the feature map for resizing spatially.
Then, high level features learned by convolutional and
pooling layers are fed into MLP for the classification.
For the back propagation, it keeps track of the index of
max activation so that routing the gradient becomes sim-
pler than general backward pass.
Autoencoder. AE [5], shown in Figure 8c, is unsuper-
vised neural network, which consists of two neural net-
works, an encoder, which learns lower-dimensional data
abstractions, and a decoder, which recovers the original
data. It aims to predict the input by using less number of
hidden neurons than input nodes to learn as much infor-
mation as it can learn to hidden neurons. More specifi-
cally, since the number of hidden nodes at each hidden
layer is less than the dimension of the original input vec-
tor, the network is forced to learn a compressed repre-
sentation of the input data and then reconstruct the input.
Through these procedures, the network can discover in-
teresting structure of the data.
One advantage with an AE is that at the end of train-
ing, we can have weights that lead to the hidden layer
(blue layer in Figure 8c), we can train using certain in-
put. Furthermore, when we meet other data later, we can
reduce its dimensionality using those weights without re-
training. âA˘Ł Thus, it provides benefits to reduce the
feature dimensionality for data visualization and reduc-
ing the noise in the data. Hidden units in an encoder keep
as much information as it can while denoising the data.
The attractive part is that we can elaborate feature extrac-
tion using encoded data through the cost function since
we have a lot of choice on the cost function and can ad-
just the weight for each class and sample. We can use
this power to reflect certain phenomenons in the dataset,
which eventually leads to a more efficient and meaning-
ful data representation. In Section 6.5, we focus on this
functionality of dimensionality reduction [15]. We used
MLP for an encoder and a decoder, while varying the
number of hidden units in a hidden layer of an encoder.
To construct a more generative model, Variational AE
(VAE) was introduced by Kingma and Welling [19] and
Rezende et al. [30]. Instead of memorizing a fuzzy data
structure, it generates latent vectors following a Gaussian
distribution by forcing a constraint to an encoder. Sub-
sequently, to compute the loss of a VAE, two types of
losses must be considered, the error between the input
and reconstructed data, and the loss between latent vari-
ables and a unit Gaussian, reflected by KL divergence.
Training VAE is tricky due to the trade off between these
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two different losses. Improvement in the generalization
also promotes the quality of data reconstruction by a de-
coder.
Avoid overfitting. DNN usually struggles with overfit-
ting, which means that the network memorized the train-
ing samples and hence, the error in testing dataset is large
even though the training loss is tiny. To overcome this
issue, dropout [36] and regularization are widely used.
The dropout temporarily removes units in layers based
on the probability of each unit to be retained. Regular-
ization is also known as weight decay, which means that
it penalizes large weights based on constraints on their
squared values (L2) or absolute values (L1). We applied
these techniques to both MLP and CNN architectures in
Section 4.4.
C LRP Score and Tor Cell Direction.
For each Tor cell direction, -1(incoming), 0(padding),
and 1(outgoing), we scatter LRP scores in Figure 9. As
shown in the graph, there is no distinction among incom-
ing, outgoing, and padding Tor cells and the average of
each of them is 0.001 and the standard deviation is very
small enough to be negligible.
D HTML Features
We list 65 features, extracted based on an HTML DOM
and offer details how we generated those in Section 5.1.
• 1. total number of links
• 2. total number of links from same domain
• 3. total number of third party links
• 4. total number of domains in links
• 5. total number of unique domains in links
• 6. total number of tag paths
• 7. total number of unique tag paths
• 8. sum of number of unique tags per a path
• 9. median of number of unique tags per a path
• 10. mean of number of unique tags per a path
• 11. std of number of unique tags per a path
• 12. total number of change of tag path direction (if
depth increases, positive, otherwise, negative)
• 13. total number of non change of tag path direction
• 14. total number of positive direction in tag paths
• 15. total number of negative direction in tag paths
• 16. total sum of tag depths
• 17. std of tag depths
• 18. total number of max depth in tag paths
• 19. total number of min depth in tag paths
• 20. total number of median depth in tag paths
• 21. total number of rounded mean depth in tag paths
• 22. total number of 30% percentile of depth in tag
paths
• 23. total number of 70% percentile of depth in tag
paths
• 24. max depth of tag paths
• 25. min depth of tag paths
• 26. median depth in tag paths
• 27. rounded mean depth in tag paths
• 28. 30% percentile of depth in tag paths
• 29. 70% percentile of depth in tag paths
• 30. total number of tags
• 31. total number of unique tags
• 32. total number of comments
• 33. total number of attributes
• 34. total number of unique attributes
• 35. total number of characters
• 36. total number of characters in script tag
• 37. total number of characters in style attribute
• 38. total number of characters in attribute
• 39. total number of characters in data including
those in script and style attributes
• 40. total number of characters in data attribute
• 41. total number of words in data including those in
script and style attributes
• 42. total number of words in data attribute
• 43. total number of image tags in HTML DOM
• 44. portion of image tags over all tag paths
• 45. total number of png files in HTML DOM
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(a) Multilayer perceptron (b) Convolutional neural network. (c) Autoencoder
Figure 8: Our architectures on 3 DNN models.
Figure 9: LRP scores depending on Tor cell direction.
• 46.portion of png files in HTML DOM
• 47. total number of ico files in HTML DOM
• 48. portion of ico files in HTML DOM
• 49. total number of jpg files in HTML DOM
• 50. portion of jpg files in HTML DOM
• 51. total number of gif files in HTML DOM
• 52. portion of gif files in HTML DOM
• 53. total number of bmp files in HTML DOM
• 54. portion of bmp files in HTML DOM
• 55. total number of html files in HTML DOM
• 56. portion of html files in HTML DOM
• 57. total number of css files in HTML DOM
• 58. portion of css files in HTML DOM
• 59. total number of js files in HTML DOM
• 60. portion of js files in HTML DOM
• 61. total number of mp3 files in HTML DOM
• 62. total number of avi files in HTML DOM
• 63. total loading time in a capture (pcap) file
• 64. size of a html document file
• 65. size of a capture file
E The Relationship between AE Feature
Dimension and Performance of Tradi-
tional ML Techniques.
We varied the number of nodes in the second hidden
layer (Figure 8c) to show its impact on the performance
of state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms, SVM, k-
NN, and k-FP classifiers. As shown in Figure 10, AE
feature dimension gave almost no change in the qual-
ity of binary classification and the multiclass classifiers
performed similarly with AE features whose dimension
is greater than 20. This indicates that AE has superior
ability to capture meaningful pattern about the input data
while reducing the feature dimensionality.
(a) Binary setting (b) Multiclass setting
Figure 10: Feature importance score using LRP.
F Top 15 Features for Fingerprintability
Prediction over Unpopular Websites
We computed the sum of feature importance score for
each of 65 HTML feature indices and selected top 15
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Table 13: Top 15 html properties based feature impor-
tance measured by gini index
.
Top 15 Features
total number of unique domains in links
total number of third party links
total number of unique tags
total number of gif files attached in document
total number of html files attached in document
total number of words in data including script and style
proportion of html files attached in document
total number of ico files attached in document
total number of unique tag paths
portion of ico files attached in document
total number of domains in links
std of number of unique tags per a path
proportion of gif files attached in document
total number of change of tag path direction
total number of characters in data field
Table 14: Top 15 html properties based feature impor-
tance measured by gini index when using 85 unpopular
websites
.
Top 15 Features
maximum depth of tag paths
median of number of unique tags per a tag path
mean of number of unique tags per a tag path
total number of domains in HTML DOM
total number of png files attached in HTML DOM
total number of tag paths in HTML DOM
proportion of image tags over all tag paths
total number of image tags in HTML DOM
total number of unique domains in links
total number of unique attributes in HTML DOM
std of number of unique tags per a tag path
std of number of unique tags per a tag path
total number of characters in data including script and style attributes
total number of links in HTML DOM
proportion of gif files attached in HTML DOM
features, which are more important to predict the finger-
printability. Top 15 features to predict the fingerprint-
ability for Alexa top 61-100 websites are listed in Ta-
ble 13 and those for Alexa 85 unpopular websites are
listed in Table 14. As mentioned in Section 6.6, fea-
tures based on domains and embedded web contents im-
pact the fingerprintability of websites across different
datasets.
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